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looming crisis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Though cryptocurrency is a relatively recent phenomenon, the 
academic literature is already replete with attempts to quantify the radical 
ways in which this new form of asset will uproot society.1 Bankruptcy is one 
area that is beginning to bear out these predictions, as courts respond to new 
and complex questions relating to assets, liabilities, and contractual 
 
 1 See, e.g., Asress Adimi Gikay, Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment 
Services Law: Lessons from European Union Law, 9 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 2 (2018) 
(“The only constant is the fast evolution of cryptocurrencies and businesses centered on them and the 
lack of robust legal framework regulating them in many areas.”); Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. 
Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 
32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 495 (2015) (arguing that “the operation of wallets and exchanges requires a new 
commercial law that lays out rights and liabilities of cryptocurrency users in a robust and transparent 
fashion”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2016) (explaining the potential effects on poverty in the developing world if the blockchain proves 
to be “that holy grail of commerce—a payments system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of 
third party intermediaries”); Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency 
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 274 (2015) (noting “the unique challenges that 
face policymakers in creating a consistent, cohesive, and appropriately-scaled legal and regulatory 
framework for virtual currencies”); Lance Koonce, The Wild, Distributed World: Get Ready for Radical 
Infrastructure Changes, from Blockchains to the Interplanetary File System to the Internet of Things, 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (May 13, 2016), https://www.dwt.com/the-wild-distributed-world-get-
ready-for-radical-infrastructure-changes-from-blockchains-to-the-interplanetary-file-system-to-the-
internet-of-things-05-13-2016 [https://perma.cc/WH33-RJBP] (predicting that the advent of blockchain 
“means that a wide range of industries stands to be disrupted and reinvented, and that the winds of change 
are going to blow in from every quadrant”). 
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obligations involving cryptocurrencies.2 Outside of the bankruptcy context, 
regulators have endeavored to design frameworks to address this new form 
of asset.3 However, so far, bankruptcy courts have yet to forge a clear 
framework for dealing with crypto assets.4 
This Essay argues that a cogent and comprehensive approach to 
managing crypto assets5 in bankruptcy proceedings will be critical in the 
coming years as these assets will likely play an increasingly significant role 
in the bankruptcies of the future.6 The unique features of crypto assets also 
pose unique challenges for liquidations and reorganizations, including a 
heightened risk that debtors will use crypto holdings to shield assets from 
creditors; valuation problems that arise during liquidation or reorganization; 
the possibility that stakeholders may use bankruptcy opportunistically to 
exploit the value fluctuations in crypto-collateral;7 and questions about 
 
 2 See, e.g., Devika Krishna Kumar, Mt. Gox Founder Won’t Appear in U.S. for Questions About 
Bankruptcy Case, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2014, 9:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-
mtgox/mt-gox-founder-wont-appear-in-u-s-for-questions-about-bankruptcy-case-idUSBREA3E02S20 
140415 [https://perma.cc/QNT4-DUN4] (discussing developments in In re MtGox Co., Ch. 15 No. 14-
31229-sgj15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (filing under Chapter 15 by the Japanese Bitcoin exchange that lost 
$500 million to hackers)); Robin Sidel & Katy Stech, Bitcoin Firm Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 4, 2013, 7:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-firm-files-for-bankruptcy-1383609802 
[https://perma.cc/ZY4P-BXVM]  (discussing developments in In re CLI Holdings, Inc., Ch. 11 No. 13-
19746-KAO (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (filing under Chapter 11 by a business that was contractually 
obligated to mine and deliver Bitcoins to a counterparty)). 
 3 See generally Stephanie A. Lemchuk, Virtual Whats?: Defining Virtual Currencies in the Face of 
Conflicting Regulatory Guidances, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 319 (2017); Tara Mandjee, 
Bitcoin, Its Legal Classification and Its Regulatory Framework, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 157, 182 (2015) 
(arguing for three main approaches to effective government oversight: “A) measures to prevent financial 
crimes, B) taxation, and C) consumer protection, including data security issues”). 
 4 See, e.g., Jhanile T. Smith, Bitcoin Exchanges in Bankruptcy: The Square Peg in the Round Hole, 
35 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2016, at 46–47 (identifying several unanswered questions arising from 
bankruptcies of crypto exchanges such as Mt. Gox); see also Adam J. Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: 
The Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 311–12 (2018) (noting that courts are 
just beginning to grapple with the issues surrounding digital payment systems). 
 5 To avoid the suggestion that Bitcoin or other digital “currencies” resemble fiat currency, this Essay 
uses the terms “crypto assets,” “crypto holdings,” or “digital assets” instead of “cryptocurrency.” 
 6 See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in Crypto-Currency, 21 SMU 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 159, 159 (2018) (“[A]ll signs suggest that, in the years to come, investments in one 
or another form of crypto-currency will become more routine and more substantial.”). 
 7 Increasing numbers of lenders are recognizing crypto holdings as possible collateral for loans. See 
generally Ashlyn L. Robinson, Crypto-Collateral? Securing Loans with Digital Currency, LAW.COM 
(Mar. 21, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/03/21/crypto-collateral-securing-
loans-with-digital-currency/?slreturn=20200014102547 [https://perma.cc/8PA4-UHV7] (examining the 
question of whether lenders should accept crypto assets as collateral for loans). 
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courts’ authority to issue and enforce binding decisions involving digital 
assets that defy traditional jurisdictional frameworks.8 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I explains why the undefined 
nature of crypto assets creates confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders in 
the bankruptcy process. Part II sketches out the unique features of crypto 
assets that pose the greatest challenges for bankruptcy and insolvency 
systems, highlighting cases where these features have already played a 
disruptive role. Part III concludes with a call to action, arguing that a laissez-
faire attitude would be detrimental to the orderly development of the market 
for crypto assets, and possibly to the U.S. bankruptcy system as a whole. 
I. WHAT IS A CRYPTO ASSET AND WHY DOES IT MATTER  
FOR BANKRUPTCY? 
Debates surrounding the proper legal characterization of crypto assets 
like Bitcoin have been a boon for the legal academy, the source of a 
seemingly endless stream of articles, notes, and comments over the past 
decade.9 Rather than summarizing the useful histories of regulatory efforts 
at the local, federal, and international levels provided by other scholars, this 
Essay will merely note that existing regulatory efforts—while substantial—
nonetheless fall short of answering a critical question: What is a crypto 
asset?10 
 
8 For the purposes of this Essay, I am setting aside a fourth, overarching problem: the issue of in rem 
jurisdiction for crypto assets. Some have argued that in rem jurisdiction should be tied to the location of 
the server on which transactional data is stored. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 19 N.C. 
L. REV. 1643, 1676 (2012) (arguing in the context of probate law that states lack jurisdiction over the 
disposition of online social media accounts unless the servers are located in state). Others have suggested 
that new jurisdictional frameworks may be necessary for digital assets. See, e.g., Howard Seife, Cross-
Border Professionals Respond to Chapter 15 Proposals, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2019, at 8 (“Given 
recent technological advances and the ‘virtual’ nature of certain businesses, a company incorporated in 
an offshore jurisdiction may not have a physical place of operations or otherwise engage in traditional 
business activities in its place of incorporation, thereby creating certain challenges for recognition of 
offshore foreign proceedings.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Evan Hewitt, Bringing Continuity to Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law as a Guide to the 
Asset Categorization of Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 619 (2016) (surveying various federal and state 
approaches to regulation and proposing a new asset type: “electronic pseudo-currency”); Lemchuk, supra 
note 3, at 341–50 (surveying various approaches to domestic regulation and concluding that regulation as 
a commodity is most appropriate); Mandjee, supra note 3, at 182 (surveying domestic and international 
efforts to regulate Bitcoin); Mann, supra note 6, at 160–63 (discussing IRS, SEC, and Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) developments). 
 10 See, e.g., Mandjee, supra note 3, at 164–66 (describing the disagreements among regulators and 
courts about how to classify crypto assets such as Bitcoin); Mann, supra note 6, at 160–63 (explaining 
that crypto assets do not fit squarely into any existing framework and should therefore be considered 
“general intangibles” for the purposes of the UCC). 
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Meanwhile, bankruptcy courts have not even attempted to answer the 
question of what a crypto asset is. This Part argues that developing a clear 
answer to the question will be essential to the stakeholders in a bankruptcy 
that involves crypto assets. Not only does an answer give parties more clarity 
for the purposes of ex ante bargaining, but a definite framework would have 
the added benefit of making insolvency proceedings more efficient because 
stakeholders would have more certainty about the outcome.11 Section I.A 
begins by giving a brief overview of the U.S. bankruptcy system in order to 
introduce some of the key stakeholders and procedural mechanisms 
discussed in this Essay. Section I.B then examines a bankruptcy case that 
identified but did not resolve several critical issues surrounding the nature of 
crypto assets. The Section concludes by arguing that the ongoing lack of 
clarity surrounding these issues suggests that legislative intervention may be 
necessary. 
A. A Brief Overview of the U.S. Bankruptcy System 
This Section briefly introduces some of the key concepts and 
stakeholders in the United States bankruptcy system, in order to provide 
nonspecialist readers with some context for the common issues likely to arise 
with crypto assets. There are four types of bankruptcy discussed in this 
Essay: Chapter 7 liquidations for consumers and businesses,12 Chapter 13 
payment plans for consumers,13 Chapter 11 for business reorganizations,14 
 
 11 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Osterman & Debra A. Dandeneau, Bankruptcy and Modern Technology 
Transactions: An Old Bottle for New Wine, 25 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 181, 197 (2016) 
(“[M]ismatches between bankruptcy law and current practices . . . divert time and attention during 
negotiation of deals, and all-to-often leave clients still uncertain as to the extent to which they will be 
protected in the future.”). 
 12 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (eligibility for Chapter 7); id. §§ 701–27 (procedures specific to Chapter 7). 
Chapter 7 also prescribes more detailed procedures for a variety of specific types of liquidations, 
including stockbroker liquidation provisions, id. §§ 741–53, and commodity broker liquidation 
provisions, id. §§ 761–67. These subcategories of Chapter 7 might be implicated in a liquidation of a 
crypto exchange. However, as explained in Section I.B, the indeterminate nature of crypto assets creates 
challenges for predicting which, if any, of these procedures might apply in the event that a domestic 
crypto exchange files for bankruptcy. 
 13 Id. § 109(e) (providing eligibility for Chapter 13); id. §§ 1301–30 (listing procedures specific to 
Chapter 13). 
 14 Id. § 109(d) (providing eligibility for Chapter 11); id. §§ 1101–46 (listing procedures specific to 
Chapter 11). Individuals can also use Chapter 11 to reorganize. This use is most common for high-net-
worth individuals who are not eligible for Chapter 7 or individuals with high debts who are not eligible 
for Chapter 13. This Essay refers briefly to the bankruptcy of the rap mogul Curtis James Jackson (also 
known as 50 Cent), who filed a Chapter 11 petition. See Zack Guzman, 50 Cent Files for Bankruptcy, 
CNBC (July 13, 2015, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/13/50-cent-files-for-bankruptcy.html 
[https://perma.cc/3272-NDNN]. 
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and Chapter 15 for cross-border cases.15 The person or entity filing for 
bankruptcy is the “debtor,”16 and the debtor initiates the bankruptcy process 
by filing a petition,17 which is followed by detailed schedules that include 
lists of the debtor’s assets and liabilities.18 
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a relatively quick and streamlined process.19 
For a business, a Chapter 7 filing means that the business is dissolving and 
using the bankruptcy to make an orderly distribution of its assets to the 
business’s creditors.20 For an individual consumer, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
allows the debtor to liquidate nonexempt assets for distribution to creditors.21 
Although debtors can use exemptions to shield some assets from liquidation22 
(such as a home or a car, at least up to a certain dollar value),23 crypto assets 
are not covered by most exemptions and would therefore usually be 
liquidated in order to pay creditors.24 Following this liquidation, the debtor 
receives a discharge which covers most types of unsecured consumer debts.25 
 
 15 11 U.S.C § 1501 (stating the purpose of Chapter 15); id. §§ 1502–32 (listing procedures specific 
to Chapter 15). 
 16 Id. § 101(13) (defining “debtor”). 
 17 See id. § 301(a) (setting forth the method of commencing a voluntary bankruptcy case). 
 18 See id. § 521 (describing the schedules that a debtor must file after commencing a case). 
 19 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local 
Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 801, 815 (1994) (contrasting a consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which “is typically completed in 
less than six months,” with the longer and more cumbersome Chapter 13 process). 
 20 See David S. Kupetz, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: Effective Tool for Acquiring and 
Winding Up Distressed Businesses, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2015, at 1–2 (explaining that for distressed 
businesses that are winding down operations, Chapter 7 “provides a procedure for the orderly liquidation 
of the assets of the debtor and the ultimate payment of creditors in the order of priority set forth in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code”). 
 21 See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness 
May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943 (2011) (“In theory, the 
‘deal’ provided by Chapter 7 is that the debtor will surrender all nonexempt assets and, in exchange, will 
receive a ‘fresh start,’ free of most unsecured debt.”). 
 22 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (prescribing the process for claiming exemptions under either federal or 
state law). 
 23 See id. § 522(d)(1) (setting forth a federal exemption of up to $15,000 for equity in real property); 
id. § 522(d)(2) (setting forth a federal exemption of up to $2,400 of value in a motor vehicle). These 
federal dollar limits are adjusted every three years. See id. § 104(a). 
 24 The federal exemptions include a “wild card exemption” that can be applied to any asset, up to a 
certain dollar value. See id. § 522(d)(5) (allowing a debtor who is using the federal exemptions to 
designate as exempt up to $800 in any property, plus up to $7,500 of any unused portion of the real 
property exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)). If eligible for a wildcard exemption, a debtor could have 
a way to shield at least some crypto assets from liquidation. 
 25 See id. § 727 (describing the discharge process). Several types of debt are nondischargeable. See 
id. § 523. Common examples of nondischargeable debt include domestic support obligations, most taxes, 
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A key stakeholder in either type of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the trustee, 
a private attorney who is appointed by the court to represent the collective 
interests of the creditors.26 The trustee’s primary goal is to identify 
nonexempt assets that are available for liquidation, for the benefit of 
creditors, and then sell them.27 Because crypto assets are not generally 
exempt, a trustee can be expected to liquidate any crypto assets that a debtor 
has disclosed in her schedules.28 
Chapter 7 trustees also have various mechanisms at their disposal to 
help them recover assets that a business or consumer debtor may have 
transferred in the months, and sometimes years, leading up to bankruptcy.29 
These mechanisms are generally referred to as the trustee’s avoiding 
powers.30 Finally, the Chapter 7 trustee is also tasked with determining 
whether a debtor has properly disclosed all assets, including crypto assets, 
and conducting further investigation if there are doubts about whether a 
debtor has made a complete and accurate disclosure.31 A debtor who fails to 
completely and accurately fill out the required schedules can be denied a 
discharge.32 The denial of a discharge then renders nondischargeable all of 
the debt that could have been discharged in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.33 Thus, 
a debtor’s failure to accurately disclose crypto assets in the bankruptcy 
schedules could make the debtor worse off than if the debtor had never filed 
for bankruptcy at all. 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is also an option for consumers, but it operates 
differently from Chapter 7 liquidations.34 In Chapter 13, a debtor develops a 
 
and student loans. The latter category is only dischargeable upon a showing of “undue hardship.” See id. 
§ 523(a)(8). 
 26 Id. § 701 (providing for the appointment of a trustee in Chapter 7); id. § 704 (listing duties of 
Chapter 7 trustee). 
 27 See id. § 704(a)(1). 
 28 See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
 29 11 U.S.C. §§ 544–50. 
 30 See generally Richard B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee’s Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 173 (1979) (providing an overview of the tools available to the trustee under the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
 31 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4); see also id. §§ 341(d), 343 (requiring the trustee to examine the debtor 
under oath and permitting other stakeholders to conduct an examination as well). An additional 
stakeholder, known colloquially as the U.S. Trustee’s Office, also plays a broader oversight role in the 
bankruptcy process and provides an added layer of fraud detection. 28 U.S.C. § 586 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(5). 
 33 Id. § 523(a)(10). 
 34 Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 814–17 (explaining the “different legal bargain” 
made by Chapter 13 debtors). 
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long-term35 payment plan and commits a portion of his or her future wages 
toward the plan.36 After the plan is confirmed and fully executed, the debtor 
receives a discharge of most of the remaining unsecured consumer debts.37 
Unlike a Chapter 7 debtor, who must give up nonexempt assets, the Chapter 
13 debtor can typically opt to keep his or her assets.38 Thus, a Chapter 13 
debtor could ordinarily file for bankruptcy without putting crypto assets at 
risk. However, Chapter 13 becomes significant for debtors that have used 
their crypto assets as security for loans because a Chapter 13 debtor can ask 
the court to reduce or eliminate the liens that a secured creditor has on the 
debtor’s assets.39 The possibility that debtors will use these lien-stripping 
provisions opportunistically will be discussed in Section II.C. 
The two remaining types of bankruptcies are discussed only briefly in 
this Essay and will be given similarly brief treatment here. Chapter 11 
reorganization is used primarily (but not exclusively) by businesses40 and 
involves both a plan41 and a discharge from remaining debt.42 Unlike a 
Chapter 13 debtor, who is expected to complete plan payments before 
receiving a discharge,43 the Chapter 11 debtor obtains a discharge of 
remaining debt as soon as the plan is confirmed.44 Chapter 11 gives debtors 
a variety of tools to implement an effective reorganization,45 including 
modifying liens.46 In addition, most Chapter 11 cases allow the debtor to 
exercise the same rights to recover assets as the trustee exercises in a Chapter 
 
 35 The Chapter 13 payment plan will either be three years or five years depending on debtor 
characteristics that are not significant here. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4). 
 36 Id. § 1322(a)(1). 
 37 Id. § 1328(a). Debtors who have not completed their plan payments “due to circumstances for 
which the debtor should not justly be held accountable” may be eligible for a hardship discharge. Id. 
§ 1328(b)(1). Chapter 13 discharges are also subject to most, but not all, of the nondischargeability 
provisions discussed supra note 25. Compare id. § 1328(a)(1)–(4), with id. § 523. 
 38 Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 814 (explaining that Chapter 13 “debtors keep 
all their property in return for an agreement to pay their trustees” a portion of their future income). 
 39 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). 
 40 See supra note 14. 
 41 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121–29 (describing the procedures for preparing and confirming a Chapter 11 plan). 
 42 Id. § 1141(d). 
 43 Id. § 1328(a). 
 44 Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
 45 See id. § 1123(a)(5). 
 46 Id. § 1123(a)(5)(E). Lien modification is generally subject to creditor approval, see id. § 1126, but 
may be authorized even over the objections of the affected lienholder under certain circumstances, known 
as cram-down. See generally Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 
11, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 113 (explaining how the cram-down process affects secured lenders). 
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7 case.47 Finally, Chapter 15 involves cross-border insolvencies for entities 
that need to resolve issues surrounding assets and liabilities in various 
jurisdictions with different insolvency systems. Typically, a debtor will file 
its main proceeding in the locale where its main business operates,48 and then 
open ancillary proceedings in other locales,49 with the expectation that those 
ancillary fora will defer to the decisions made in the main proceeding.50 
B. In re HashFast Technologies LLC: A Missed Opportunity? 
This Section examines an early opportunity for the bankruptcy system 
to at least start developing an analytical framework. This opportunity arose 
six years ago during a corporate liquidation filed in the Northern District of 
California: In re HashFast Technologies LLC.51 HashFast, a Bitcoin mining 
technology company, had pioneered a technology that purported to allow 
Bitcoin miners to outpace their competitors.52 HashFast enlisted the help of 
Dr. Marc Lowe, an early proponent of Bitcoin who had a large online 
following, to help market the technology.53 In exchange for his assistance, 
HashFast promised to pay Dr. Lowe 10% of the proceeds of the first set of 
sales, which amounted to $308,000.54 But instead of paying this commission 
in U.S. currency, HashFast paid Dr. Lowe using 3,000 bitcoins.55 When 
HashFast later found itself in bankruptcy court,56 the Chapter 11 trustee 
 
 47 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (defining “debtor in possession”); id. § 1107(a) (giving the debtor in 
possession most of the same rights as a trustee). 
 48 See id. § 1502(4) (defining a “foreign main proceeding”). 
 49 See id. § 1502(5) (defining a “foreign nonmain proceeding”). 
 50 See id. §§ 1515–21 (describing the process for obtaining recognition of the outcome of a foreign 
main proceeding). 
 51 In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 52 See Declaration of Defendant in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 5–12, Kasolas v. 
Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 5, 2016). 
 53 See id. 
 54 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Kasolas v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. 
LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 55 Id. at 3–4. 
 56 HashFast was initially the subject of a petition for involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See 
Involuntary Petition, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 9, 2014). 
The debtor successfully converted the case to a voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization. See Motion to 
Convert to Chapter 11, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 3, 2014); 
Order Granting Motion to Convert to Chapter 11, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. June 4, 2014). Eventually, the bankruptcy court approved HashFast’s Chapter 11 liquidation 
plan and appointed Michael Kasolas as the liquidation trustee. See Order Approving on a Final Basis and 
Confirming the Consolidated Plan of Liquidation, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015). 
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charged with liquidating HashFast sought to avoid, or undo, the payment as 
a fraudulent transfer.57 By that time, Dr. Lowe’s 3,000 bitcoins had more than 
tripled in value to over $1 million. Accordingly, the trustee sought to use the 
tools available in the bankruptcy code to recover either the Bitcoin itself, or 
the current value of the Bitcoin.58 In opposing the trustee’s avoidance action, 
Dr. Lowe asked the bankruptcy court to treat the Bitcoin as currency, thereby 
limiting the trustee’s recovery to a maximum of approximately $300,000.59 
During the summary judgment briefing, both parties harnessed 
available case law and regulatory frameworks to support their competing 
positions. Specifically, the trustee argued that Bitcoin should be treated as “a 
commodity, like gold, silver or pork bellies, that fluctuates in price based 
upon market conditions.”60 As supporting authority, the trustee cited a 
September 17, 2015, order from the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) requiring that virtual currencies be regulated under the 
Commodities Exchange Act.61 The trustee argued that his position was 
further supported by 2014 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidance, which 
stated that Bitcoin would be treated as property for the purpose of capital 
gains tax.62 
Meanwhile, to oppose the trustee’s motion, Dr. Lowe cited the Treasury 
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which had 
issued the first federal guidance regarding cryptocurrency in early 2013.63 
FinCEN had advised that because cryptocurrency mainly behaves like 
regular currency, it should be regulated as such.64 Dr. Lowe also pointed out 
 
 57 HashFast originally filed the motion to avoid the payment in its capacity as debtor in possession. 
See Adversary Complaint, HashFast v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015). After HashFast’s liquidation plan was confirmed, the liquidation trustee took 
over this adversary proceeding. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, HashFast v. Lowe (In re 
HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).  
 58 Under the trustee’s avoiding powers, discussed in supra note 17 and surrounding text, the trustee 
typically has the option of recovering either the value of property or the property itself, depending on 
which option is more beneficial to creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012). 
 59 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 14. 
 60 Brief in Support of Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Kasolas v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), 
Ch. 11 No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016). 
 61 Id. at 4–5. 
 62 Id. at 5. 
 63 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 5. 
 64 See Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to 
Virtual Currency Mining Operations (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-
regulations/administrative-rulings/application-fincens-regulations-virtual-0 [https://perma.cc/4NL7-
58YN] (“[FinCEN’s] guidance makes clear that an administrator or exchanger of convertible virtual 
currencies that (1) accepts and transmits a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells convertible 
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that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had described Bitcoin as “a 
kind of electronic money” in guidance issued in August 2014.65 Finally, Dr. 
Lowe argued that court briefs filed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in a separate case, along with various court opinions in 
money laundering cases involving crypto assets, lent further authority to the 
view that Bitcoin should be treated the same way as currency.66  
With such a well-briefed motion, the HashFast case presented a prime 
opportunity for the bankruptcy court to take a critical first step toward 
developing a working approach to crypto assets in bankruptcy. Instead, the 
court only addressed Dr. Lowe’s argument that crypto assets should be 
treated as the equivalent of U.S. dollars.67 In a terse, two-page order rejecting 
this aspect of Dr. Lowe’s argument, the court stated that there was no need 
to go beyond this narrow ruling because the trustee had not yet established 
his claim for avoidance.68 After determining that Bitcoin was not the 
equivalent of U.S. currency, the court deferred further consideration of what 
exactly Bitcoin was, and what the trustee’s rights to the Bitcoin might be. 
The court explained that it was unnecessary to address these further issues 
until the trustee had first established that HashFast’s transfer was 
fraudulent.69 
That day never came because the parties opted to settle rather than 
continue to litigate over an uncertain benefit or loss.70 Indeed, even four years 
later, these issues remain largely uncharted territory for bankruptcy courts. 
This lack of clarity over the nature of crypto assets and a trustee’s recovery 
 
virtual currency in exchange for currency of legal tender or another convertible virtual currency for any 
reason (including when intermediating between a user and a seller of goods or services the user is 
purchasing on the user’s behalf) is a money transmitter under FinCEN’s regulations . . . .”).  
 65 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 6; see also CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU, RISKS TO CONSUMERS POSED BY VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2014), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consumer-advisory_virtual-currencies.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PG5Q-AJA3]. 
 66 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 5–6 (pointing to the 
government’s argument in another case that Bitcoin should be treated as money for the purposes of the 
SEC’s enforcement action against a Ponzi scheme); see also id. at 8 (citing the court’s prior holding that 
Bitcoin was a “decentralized digital currency”); id. at 7–8 (citing the holding that Bitcoin was a monetary 
instrument for the purposes of the federal money laundering statutes because holding otherwise would 
“be nonsensical”). 
 67 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, HashFast v. Lowe, (In re HashFast Techs. 
LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016). 
 68 Id. at 1–2. 
 69 Id. at 2. 
 70 See Stipulation to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding with Prejudice, Kasolas v. Lowe, (In re HashFast 
Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 17, 2016). 
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rights risks leaving the bankruptcy system in limbo because trustees are 
unable to meaningfully evaluate whether to pursue avoidance actions in 
situations when a crypto asset has dramatically increased in value after 
leaving a debtor’s hands. Although the payoff from a successful avoidance 
action would be significant, both for the trustee and for creditors, trustees 
must balance the possibility of a large recovery (which would likely be 
appealed) against the risk of walking away with nothing to show for their 
litigation efforts. At this point, congressional intervention may be the 
likeliest way to obtain clarity regarding these issues. 
II. CRYPTO ASSETS ARE NOT LIKE ANY OTHER ASSETS 
As Part I illustrates, no clear framework has yet emerged for how to 
characterize crypto assets in bankruptcy. This Part argues that efforts to force 
crypto assets into an existing category or framework is not an ideal solution 
because existing frameworks are inadequate to address the unique challenges 
that these digital assets pose to bankruptcy and insolvency systems. There 
are four features that make these assets particularly challenging. First, crypto 
assets are typically bought and sold through pseudonymous71 transactions, 
which pose challenges for determining ownership as well as obtaining key 
details regarding transfers. Second, crypto assets that are traded on 
exchanges72 present a false facade of liquidity, which adds a potentially 
unexpected layer of complexity to court-ordered asset sales. Third, crypto 
assets are highly volatile, which creates a heightened risk of opportunistic 
behavior. Fourth, to the extent that crypto assets are digital constructions that 
exist “on the cloud” rather than in physical form, these assets defy traditional 
jurisdictional characterizations. Each of these features is described in more 
detail below. 
A. Opportunities for Anonymous Transactions 
Crypto assets allow for a greater level of anonymity than ordinary 
assets, at least in theory.73 Although the names of the purchasers and sellers 
 
 71 “Pseudonymous” may be a better term than “anonymous,” because although the blockchain does 
not reveal the name of a buyer or seller, the blockchain does retain other identifying information. See 
NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS AND 
MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 84 (2015). 
 72 See infra text accompanying notes 131–135. 
 73 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 84 (“Bitcoin was actually less anonymous than most people 
believed, owing to the record of all transactions on the blockchain.”). Other crypto assets promise greater 
levels of anonymity than Bitcoin. See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 163–64 (describing Darkcoin, a Bitcoin 
alternative that offers “increased anonymity”). 
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of crypto assets are generally not associated with specific transactions, the 
blockchain stores other identifying information about each transaction.74 To 
understand this aspect of crypto assets, it is helpful to consider the context 
for the creation of one of the most prominent crypto assets: Bitcoin. Bitcoin 
was born out of an economic libertarianism that skirted the boundaries of 
anarchy,75 motivated in large part by the desire to create a means of storing 
and transferring wealth that would be less easily tracked and controlled by 
centralized authorities.76 Indeed, it is no coincidence that Bitcoin’s early 
prominence paralleled the development of Silk Road, a website that enabled 
all manner of illicit transactions, from drug deals to human trafficking.77 The 
developer of Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, recognized early on that Bitcoin 
solved a critical problem for those seeking to use the internet for illegal 
transactions.78 While other types of electronic payment systems required 
buyers and sellers to use their names, the pseudonymous nature of 
blockchain technology enabled buyers and sellers to transact with nothing 
more than a post office box.79 
Similarly, it is probably no coincidence that Bitcoin’s value dropped 
more than 20% in the two hours following the FBI’s bust of Silk Road.80 In 
the panicked words of one Bitcoin forum poster: “I just hope that mainstream 
adoption has surpassed the adoption of criminals and drug dealers. LOL! 
 
 74 See generally POPPER, supra note 71 (providing an in-depth story of Bitcoin and how digital 
currencies work). 
 75 See id. at 110–12 (describing Bitcoin’s well-timed introduction against the backdrop of Occupy 
Wall Street). 
 76 See Nathaniel Rich, Ponzi Schemes, Private Yachts, and a Missing $250 Million in Crypto: The 
Strange Tale of Quadriga, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/11/the-
strange-tale-of-quadriga-gerald-cotten [https://perma.cc/C743-36WR] (explaining that Canada’s leading 
crypto exchange, Quadriga, “trade[d] tens of millions of dollars worth of Bitcoin with accounts connected 
to known Ponzi schemes and illegal marketplaces”); see also Mandjee, supra note 3, at 183 (“[G]iven the 
potential abuse of virtual currencies and the increasing recognition that they were used to facilitate illicit 
transactions and to launder criminal proceeds . . . FinCEN provided guidelines on ‘virtual currencies,’ 
subjecting them to the regulations applicable to money transmitters.”). 
 77 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 167 (“[As of 2012,] the most successful entrepreneur in the Bitcoin 
world was . . . Ross Ulbricht, the operator of the world’s largest drug bazaar.”); id. at 119 (noting that the 
Silk Road “provid[ed] a good showcase for how anonymous markets and decentralized currencies could 
work in practice”); see also Margaret Ryznar, The Future of Bitcoin Futures, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 554 
(2019) (“[B]itcoin’s background [is] an anonymous cryptocurrency for criminals.”). 
 78 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 71. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Bitcoin Value Drops After FBI Shuts Silk Road Drugs Site, BBC (Oct. 3, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24381847 [https://perma.cc/Y6C9-2993] (“The going rate for the 
virtual currency dropped from more than $140 . . . to around $110 . . . .”). 
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Otherwise its [sic] time to SELL! SELL! SELL!”81 Although mainstream 
adoption did ultimately keep Bitcoin values high (thanks to opportunistic 
investors who had been looking for the right moment to buy),82 the Silk Road 
saga highlights the ways in which the relative anonymity of crypto assets can 
facilitate illegal activity.83 
Tax authorities have begun to recognize the challenges posed by crypto 
assets that lack easy traceability, particularly the risk that these assets will be 
used to shield wealth from taxation.84 Although international consensus 
about how to properly tax cryptocurrencies appears to be a distant prospect,85 
domestically, the tax issues are much clearer. In 2014, the IRS opted to treat 
Bitcoin as property for the purposes of calculating capital gains and gross 
income.86 Perhaps in an attempt to induce voluntary compliance with its 
newly announced stance, the IRS also created a safe harbor that would allow 
Bitcoin investors to pay back taxes without penalty.87 Investors who had 
reasonable cause for not previously paying taxes on Bitcoin had the 
opportunity to pay back their taxes to the IRS, but those who failed to take 
advantage of this safe harbor were warned that they were “open[ing] 
themselves to penalties, interest and possible fraud prosecution.”88 Then, in 
late 2019, the IRS added a question to Schedule 1 of its tax forms, asking 
filers whether “[a]t any time during 2019, did you receive, sell, send, 
exchange, or otherwise acquire any financial interest in any virtual 
 
 81 POPPER, supra note 71, at 250 (noting that the market price of Bitcoin dropped from $140 to $110 
within two hours of the FBI’s seizure of the Silk Road website). 
 82 See id. at 250–51 (explaining that a “surge of buying” from investors including the Winklevoss 
twins helped Bitcoin to rebound within a few days). 
 83 Despite Ulbricht’s efforts to remain anonymous, he was eventually apprehended at a local branch 
of the San Francisco Public Library while using their free Wi-Fi to log into his Silk Road account. See 
POPPER, supra note 71, at 246–48. During his subsequent criminal trial, Ulbricht argued that he could not 
be convicted of money laundering because Bitcoin was not a “monetary instrument[]” for the purposes 
of federal law. See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The district court 
rejected this argument as “nonsensical,” reasoning that “the only value for Bitcoin lies in its ability to pay 
for things.” Id. at 570. Dr. Lowe subsequently cited this decision in his effort to convince the bankruptcy 
court that his Bitcoin was the equivalent of U.S. currency. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text. 
 84 See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 187–88. 
 85 See id. at 189–92 (comparing the IRS’s treatment of Bitcoin as property in the United States with 
the treatment of Bitcoin in the tax systems of Canada, Singapore, Germany, and the U.K.). 
 86 See id. at 189. 
 87 See id. at 189–90 (indicating that IRS rules provide penalty relief for persons who can prove 
reasonable cause for nonfiling). 
 88 Id. at 189 (quoted source omitted). 
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currency?”89 Likewise, some state regulators have also taken steps to 
facilitate the collection of tax revenues from crypto assets.90 Although the 
ultimate success of these efforts remains to be seen, these efforts show that 
tax regulators are attempting to be proactive about addressing the issue of 
crypto assets. 
The relative anonymity of crypto investments poses similar challenges 
for bankruptcy or insolvency systems for three closely related reasons. First, 
the speculative nature of crypto assets can create a gambling mentality, with 
some ordinary consumers going deeply into debt in the hopes of a big win. 
For example, one early Bitcoin evangelizer went deeply into credit card debt 
in order to increase his holdings.91 But given the boom-and-bust nature of 
Bitcoin and other crypto assets, investors who get the timing wrong stand to 
lose significant sums of money.92 Indeed, almost everyone who invested over 
the nine-month period during late 2017 or early 2018 saw their holdings lose 
value.93 If those investments were made with borrowed funds, then these 
losses could ultimately lead to a surge in bankruptcy filings. Second, to the 
extent that crypto assets create opportunities for pseudonymous investment, 
debtors may be able to use these vehicles in order to shield assets from 
creditors. And third, the pseudonymous nature of crypto assets complicates 
trustees’ methods for avoiding preferences by making it challenging for them 
to prove when a crypto transaction occurred or to whom the assets were 
transferred. 
Concerns that debtors can use crypto holdings to conceal assets from 
creditors during a bankruptcy proceeding are not merely hypothetical. For 
example, in the case of In re Schultz, the debtor failed to disclose $30,000 
 
 89 See Darla Mercado, The IRS Has a New Tax Form Out and Wants to Know About Your 
Cryptocurrency, CNBC (Dec. 6, 2019, 1:06 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/06/the-irs-has-a-new-
tax-form-and-wants-to-know-about-your-cryptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/K7J9-KRVJ]. 
 90 For example, New York requires crypto investors to obtain a “BitLicense” that facilitates 
recordkeeping and taxation. BitLicense Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. ST. DEP’T FIN. SERVS., 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/virtual_currency_businesses/bitlicense_faqs 
[https://perma.cc/68YA-RZDT]. 
 91 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 108 (introducing early Bitcoin evangelizer Erik Voorhees, who 
opted to go deeply into credit card debt in order to devote himself full-time to developing the crypto 
market). 
 92 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper & Su-Hyun Lee, After the Bitcoin Boom: Hard Lessons for 
Cryptocurrency Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/ 
20/technology/cryptocurrency-investor-losses.html [https://perma.cc/2MAC-ETQF] (describing one 
investor whose $23,000 investment had shrunk to $4,000 and another whose $100,000 stake had dropped 
by 70%). 
 93 Id. (“Almost all of the new customers on Coinbase and Square would be in the red if they bought 
cryptocurrencies at almost any point over the last nine months and held on to them.”). 
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worth of crypto assets.94 Creditors have also begun to alert bankruptcy courts 
to the possibility that debtors may be exploiting the bankruptcy system to 
obtain a discharge of debts while shielding crypto assets from creditors.95 
One ultimately unsuccessful example of this creditor warning occurred 
in the case of In re Peeples.96 The debtors in this case had been running a 
coin dealership97 in order to provide for their family of seven.98 After the 
debtors filed for bankruptcy, the family’s landlords attempted to have their 
unpaid rental debts of close to $50,000 declared nondischargeable.99 In the 
alternative, the landlords asked the court to deny the debtors a discharge 
altogether.100 Among other things, the landlords argued that the debtors had 
failed to account for close to $30,000 in proceeds from their coin 
dealership.101 The bankruptcy court found that the debtors’ testimony about 
their business’s lack of profit from the coin dealership was not credible and 
that the debtors had failed to provide satisfactory business records to explain 
their transfers.102 Nonetheless, the court described the creditors’ suggestion 
of debtor malfeasance as “nothing more than a tempest in a teapot.”103 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the landlords had not carried their 
burden of establishing that the debtors should be denied a discharge.104 
On appeal, the landlord creditors pointed out that the missing funds may 
have been invested in Bitcoin and could now be worth millions of dollars.105 
However, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) rejected this 
argument as unsupported speculation.106 In a terse opinion, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the bankruptcy court had erred in 
concluding that the debtors had satisfied their obligation to provide sufficient 
 
 94 Schultz v. Keyword Rockstar, Inc. (In re Schultz), Ch. 7 Case No. 17-01568-LA7, Adv. No. 17-
90126-LA, 2019 WL 2385186, at *2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 4, 2019). 
 95 See, e.g., Scott Neuman, Rapper 50 Cent, Who Bragged About Owning Bitcoin, Now Denies It, 
NPR (Feb. 27, 2018, 5:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/27/589052493/ 
rapper-50-cent-who-bragged-about-owning-bitcoin-now-denies-it [https://perma.cc/49QS-HNT3]. 
 96 579 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Utah 2017). 
 97 Id. at 264–65. 
 98 Id. at 261. 
 99 Id. at 259. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 280. 
 102 Id. at 265. 
 103 Id. at 259. 
 104 Id. 
 105 In re Peeples, Ch. 7 Case No. 14-23970, Adv. No. 14-2236, 2018 WL 3424680, at *7 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. July 16, 2018). 
 106 Id. 
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records to account for the missing funds,107 but nonetheless affirmed the 
debtors’ discharge, concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 
discretion in deciding that the debtors “were not the ‘worst actors’ who 
deserved the ‘extreme step’ of being denied a discharge.”108 
The debtor-friendly decision in Peeples is unsurprising as the case 
presented only a hypothetical risk that the debtors had funneled assets into 
crypto holdings. However, the case highlights the challenges that a creditor 
who suspects that a debtor has undisclosed crypto assets faces. Precisely 
because it is so difficult to prove that debtors have crypto holdings, we might 
expect courts to respond more harshly when a debtor is actually caught red-
handed in failing to disclose these assets. But this expectation does not yet 
match reality. Thus far, bankruptcy courts appear willing to indulge a 
debtor’s nondisclosure of crypto assets as an oversight that can be corrected 
rather than treating it as a serious abuse of the bankruptcy process. 
A prime example of bankruptcy courts’ debtor-friendly approach is the 
Ninth Circuit BAP decision in In re Schultz.109 The debtor was a personal 
coach who had created a number of educational videos and webinars.110 After 
a series of disruptive life events—a fallout with his business partners, an 
extended family court battle, and a house fire—the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy, both individually and for his business.111 However, the debtor 
was caught making two significant mistakes in his schedules. First, the 
debtor failed to disclose assets, including most significantly a $30,000 
Bitcoin account.112 Second, the debtor had valued his email contact list at 
$700, despite having bragged in a webinar that his customer list was worth 
$1 million.113 The debtor’s former business partners—now creditors—asked 
the court to deny his discharge, arguing that these inaccurate disclosures 
represented a false oath in violation of the bankruptcy code.114 In opposing 
this motion, the debtor argued that he had been in a zombie-like state when 
 
 107 In re Peeples, 779 F. App’x 561, 566 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 108 Id. at 567–68. 
 109 Ch. 7 Case No. 17-01568-LA7, Adv. No. 17-90126-LA, 2019 WL 2385186 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 
4, 2019). 
 110 Id. at *1.  
 111 Id. at *1–2. Schultz filed a Chapter 7 petition on his own behalf and filed a Chapter 7 petition on 
behalf of his business, JWS Publishing, Inc., a week later. Id. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. at *3. 
 114 See id. at *6. The creditors also moved for denial of discharge under § 727(a)(5) for inadequate 
record keeping but the bankruptcy court rejected this argument. Id. at *5. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
BAP affirmed this aspect of the bankruptcy court’s decision. Id. at *10–11. 
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he filed his petitions and that he had relied on his accountant as well as advice 
from a friend.115 
After hearing testimony from the debtor, as well as the debtor’s 
accountant and therapist, the bankruptcy court rejected most of the creditors’ 
arguments in favor of denial of discharge regarding the Bitcoin account.116 
Specifically, the court found that most of the debtor’s false oaths were not 
intentional, but rather a result of “forgetfulness, lack of focus, [and] inability 
to connect the dots.”117 However, the bankruptcy court reached the opposite 
conclusion with respect to the low valuation that the debtor had assigned to 
his email list. The court explained that the fact that the debtor had 
intentionally chosen a low valuation was unreasonable and an act of 
“commission rather than [of] omission.”118 Accordingly, the bankruptcy 
court concluded that this false oath was a proper basis for denying the debtor 
a discharge. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit BAP reversed the denial of discharge.119 In 
addition to discrediting testimony regarding the potentially high value of the 
email list,120 the panel focused on the discrepancy between the court’s two 
findings regarding intent. The panel explained that there was no basis in the 
record to reconcile the finding that the debtor did not knowingly fail to 
disclose the Bitcoin account with the finding that the debtor had knowingly 
and fraudulently undervalued the email list.121 Accordingly, the panel 
concluded that the latter finding “was implausible and clearly erroneous.”122 
The pro-debtor decisions in Peeples and Schultz reflect bankruptcy 
courts’ nonchalant attitudes toward the risk that a debtor has used crypto 
holdings to shield assets from creditors. These nonchalant attitudes stand in 
stark contrast to the proactive steps taken by domestic tax regulators to 
ensure that crypto investors will pay capital gains taxes on realized profits.123 
One step that bankruptcy courts can adopt is to specifically ask debtors about 
crypto assets, just as the IRS recently added a specific question about 
cryptocurrency to federal income tax forms.124 For example, debtors should 
be asked if they have ever purchased or owned cryptocurrency. Requiring a 
 
 115 Id. at *4. 
 116 Id. at *4–6. 
 117 Id. at *6. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at *11. 
 120 Id. at *8–9. 
 121 Id. at *10. 
 122 Id. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision is currently being appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
Keyword Rockstar, Inc. v. Schultz (In re Schultz) No. 19-60032 (9th Cir. filed July 9, 2019). 
 123 See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text. 
 124 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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clear yes-or-no answer to this question will make it less likely for a debtor to 
inadvertently fail to disclose crypto assets. In turn, this will make it easier 
for a creditor or trustee to demonstrate bad faith on the part of a debtor who 
fails to disclose significant crypto assets. 
Moreover, increased scrutiny from bankruptcy courts may be necessary 
to deter future debtors from taking advantage of the relative anonymity of 
crypto transactions. At the very least, those debtors who are caught failing to 
disclose significant crypto holdings—like the debtor in Schultz—should face 
serious consequences for failing to make a complete and accurate disclosure. 
For example, courts could conclude that the nondisclosure of any nontrivial 
amount of crypto assets, or any crypto assets directly purchased by the 
debtor, should be grounds for denying a discharge. In the absence of clear 
and unequivocal consequences for nondisclosure, courts may be 
incentivizing debtors to use crypto holdings to at least attempt to shield assets 
from liquidation. Long term, such conduct could cast doubts on the system 
as a whole, which might eventually undermine the use of Chapter 7 by honest 
debtors.125 
As noted above, the third challenge posed by the relative anonymity of 
crypto transactions relates to the trustee’s avoidance powers. In Part I, we 
saw one example of how crypto assets can create a wrinkle for the trustee’s 
authority to avoid (or undo) transactions that occur in the months, and 
sometimes even years, leading up to a bankruptcy filing.126 But anonymous 
transactions portend many more challenges, particularly to a trustee’s ability 
to avoid preferences under Section 547 of the bankruptcy code. This 
provision gives the trustee the power to avoid any transfer that occurs within 
ninety days of a bankruptcy filing.127 The recovery period extends to one year 
if the counterparty is a statutorily defined “insider”128—typically a close 
relative or business partner.129 The relative anonymity of crypto transactions 
complicates both options for trustee recovery. A debtor who admits to having 
owned crypto assets in the past may nonetheless claim to have disposed of 
these assets before the preference period (and at a lower valuation), putting 
trustees in the challenging position of having to prove a negative with limited 
 
 125 Cf. James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006) (describing the fears 
of opportunistic behavior by debtors that prompted Congress to amend the consumer bankruptcy code in 
2005). 
 126 See supra Section I.B. 
 127 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). 
 128 Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). 
 129 Id. § 101(31). 
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information. Moreover, even assuming that a trustee can develop evidence 
to determine the timing of a particular debtor transaction, the question of 
whether the transaction was conducted with an insider may be even harder 
to answer due to anonymity issues concerning the transferee.130 Thus, we are 
likely to see increased complications for trustees in future liquidation cases 
that involve crypto assets. 
In sum, the uncertain nature of crypto assets—as highlighted by the 
HashFast case—coupled with the relative anonymity of these investments 
have created many complications for stakeholders in the bankruptcy process. 
These complications undermine the prospects for creditor recovery when 
debtors choose not to be forthcoming about their crypto assets. To deal with 
these issues, bankruptcy courts should consider following the IRS’s lead by 
requiring specific disclosures of crypto assets. In addition, courts should 
consider denying a discharge to debtors who fail to make an adequate 
disclosure. 
B. The False Facade of Liquidity 
The second unique feature of crypto assets is that they often present an 
illusionary facade of liquidity. From the outside, the market for crypto assets 
resembles that of other market-traded assets, such as securities and 
commodities. Indeed, many of these assets trade on “exchanges,” and the 
current prices of these assets are usually available from a variety of internet 
sources. To the extent that this superficial resemblance to a market-traded 
asset suggests that a Bitcoin seller could actually obtain that current amount 
in fiat currency, the picture does not always accurately reflect reality.131 
Instead, early crypto investors learned the hard way that enterprises that call 
themselves “exchanges” do not operate in the way that investors in other 
market-based assets might expect.132 
 
 130 See, e.g., Eric S. Rein & John Guzzardo, The Trustee and the Bitcoin, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Aug. 2018, at 4 (“[M]ost virtual currencies are transferred between parties in an anonymous fashion that, 
in all likelihood, make it impossible for the creditor to identify the recipient or take possession of the 
transfers.”). But see POPPER, supra note 71, at 84 (noting that “sophisticated network analysis” can be 
used to glean personally identifying information from the blockchain). 
 131 See generally Smith, supra note 4 (explaining that Bitcoin exchanges function as money 
transmitters and depository institutions but are not regulated as closely). 
 132 See Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow, Twice Burned: How Mt. Gox’s Bitcoin Customers 
Could Lose Again, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/bitcoin-gox/ [https://perma.cc/S324-BS98] (noting that as of late 2017, Bitcoin exchanges have 
lost close to one million bitcoin valued at over $6 billion). 
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The insolvencies of crypto exchanges like Quadriga and Mt. Gox help 
highlight the disconnect between the “exchange” label and the reality of how 
these platforms function.133 Both the Quadriga and Mt. Gox bankruptcies 
involved entities that purported to act as exchanges for Bitcoin. Although 
these entities did provide customers with some of the functions of an 
exchange, such as being able to transfer fiat currency for crypto assets and 
vice versa, neither entity was regulated as an exchange, nor did either entity 
operate strictly as a trading market for these assets. Rather, both also served 
as wallets134 for many of the assets and currencies being exchanged in the 
crypto market. This wallet service is the main reason why each insolvency 
hit its customers much harder than did the insolvency of any exchange for 
traditional market-based assets. Similarly, many other types of insolvencies 
would allow consumers to recover up to $250,000 from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).135 When a consumer stores crypto assets in 
an online wallet, however, there is no safety net in the event of an insolvency 
by the wallet provider. 
The circumstances surrounding both insolvencies are shrouded in 
intrigue and mystery. Quadriga’s insolvency was prompted by the death of 
its founder, Gerald Cotten, in 2018.136 Since late 2013, Cotten had run 
Quadriga, one of Canada’s most prominent Bitcoin exchanges, from his 
personal MacBook Pro.137 Purportedly, Cotten kept all of the passwords to 
his customers’ accounts in encrypted files on this laptop and did not share 
 
 133 See Nikhilesh De, QuadrigaCX Officially Enters Bankruptcy with Millions Still Missing, 
COINDESK (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:17 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/quadrigacx-officially-enters-bankruptcy-
with-millions-still-missing [https://perma.cc/Y5PK-24ZN]; Hiroko Tabuchi, In Disarray, Mt. Gox 
Signals a Move Toward Liquidation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014, 10:22 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/former-bitcoin-exchange-mt-gox-set-to-liquidate-in-absence-
of-revival-plan/ [https://perma.cc/5C4F-V3QW] (discussing the bankruptcy filing of Bitcoin exchange 
Mt. Gox, which lost close to $500 million in cryptocurrency). 
 134 Levitin, supra note 4, at 315 (“A digital wallet is a computer software application that stores and 
transmits payment authorization data for [a] credit or deposit account[].”); see also Ryznar, supra note 
77, at 542–43 (explaining that many crypto investors keep their crypto assets remotely in wallets that are 
maintained on the cloud). 
 135 See How Are My Deposit Accounts Insured by the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/categories.html [https://perma.cc/8RAH-G5WY] (explaining the 
variety of deposit accounts, retirement accounts, and trust accounts subject to FDIC insurance). 
 136 See Rich, supra note 76. According to official reports, Cotten died of complications relating to 
Crohn’s disease while honeymooning in India. Id. Not surprisingly, this series of events is the subject of 
rampant internet speculation. Id. 
 137 See id. 
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the encryption codes with anyone else at the company.138 After Cotten died, 
customers were unable to access the wallets where their assets were stored.139 
Quadriga entered insolvency proceedings in Nova Scotia with Ernst & 
Young (EY) appointed as monitor.140 EY’s investigation determined that 
close to $200 million in customer funds was missing—likely funneled into 
Cotten’s pockets.141 EY has been able to collect some assets, including from 
Cotten’s widow, but customers are unlikely to recover more than a small 
fraction of the lost Bitcoin value.142 
The Mt. Gox insolvency also centered around the unexplained 
disappearance of customer assets. Mt. Gox was founded in 2010 by Jed 
McCaleb,143 who soon sold the enterprise to Mark Karpelès.144 It quickly 
became the world’s leading forum for trading Bitcoin.145 Based in Japan, Mt. 
Gox allowed customers to buy and sell Bitcoin, initially using McCaleb’s 
 
 138 See Randy Shore, Troubled Bitcoin Trader QuadrigaCX Takes Another Bizarre Turn, 
VANCOUVER SUN (Feb. 1, 2019), https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/troubled-bitcoin-trader-
quadrigacx-takes-another-bizarre-turn/ [https://perma.cc/42WL-LNR8] (quoting an affidavit from 
Cotten’s colleague which states that “[t]he laptop computer from which Gerry carried out the company’s 
business is encrypted and I do not know the password or recovery key”); see also Rich, supra note 76 
(describing an episode in which Cotten became hysterical upon realizing that he had left his laptop on a 
yacht that was departing from the dock). 
 139 See Henry Mance, Left High and Dry by a Crypto Founder’s Demise, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/6f10707a-2ac1-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8 [https://perma.cc/37S4-UKF2] 
(“For years, I’ve had one thing in common with most cryptocurrency investors: I know almost nothing 
about cryptocurrency. I now share something else with users of cryptocurrency trading platform 
QuadrigaCX: I cannot access any cryptocurrency.”). 
 140 See Message from QuadrigaCX, QUADRIGACX (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.quadrigac 
xtrustee.com/ [https://perma.cc/9T28-7JTR]. 
 141 See Paul Vigna, Quadriga Founder Spent Client Money, Bankruptcy Monitor Says, WALL ST. J. 
(Jun. 20, 2019, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/quadriga-founder-spent-client-money-
bankruptcy-monitor-says-11561070902 [https://perma.cc/YXF9-XZKN]. 
 142 See Doug Alexander, Quadriga CEO’s Widow to Return $9 Million of Estate Assets, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 7, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-07/quadriga-ceo-s-widow-
agrees-to-return-estate-assets [https://perma.cc/M29S-MHQ9]. 
 143 See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (“The Mt. Gox exchange was first launched by Jed 
McCaleb, an American software engineer, in 2010.”). McCaleb was an early adopter of Bitcoin and also 
an internationally renowned player of Magic: The Gathering, a card-based role play game, that in turn 
inspired the acronym Mt. Gox (“Magic: The Gathering Online Exchange”). See POPPER, supra note 71, 
at 51. The website that hosted the exchange was originally a forum where game players could trade cards. 
See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132. However, after several frustrating months trying to run a Bitcoin 
trading operation from his beach home in Costa Rica, McCaleb realized that he lacked the professional 
appetite to manage the enterprise full-time. See POPPER, supra note 71, at 63–65. After an early hack, 
McCaleb also recognized that he lacked the expertise necessary to provide a safe venue for customers. 
Id. at 67. 
 144 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 67–68. 
 145 As of 2012, Mt. Gox handled approximately 80% of Bitcoin trades. See id. at 203. 
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PayPal account for transactions and storage.146 However, the entity was 
plagued with numerous security breaches, which suggested that the nascent 
exchange lacked fundamental security measures.147 Likewise, its inability to 
handle high-volume trading left customers waiting extended periods for 
execution, which in turn affected their returns.148 Finally, in early 2014, Mt. 
Gox suddenly shut down for good,149 with Karpelès dodging a flood of 
questions about whether any of its customers would recover their Bitcoin.150 
Eventually, Mt. Gox’s operators revealed that 750,000 bitcoins had vanished 
from Mt. Gox wallets, wiping out virtually all of its customers as well as 
some of the exchange’s own holdings.151 The value of the lost crypto assets 
amounted to more than $400 million152 and represented approximately 6% of 
the total outstanding Bitcoin.153 Surprisingly, the price of Bitcoin remained 
relatively robust in the face of this failure.154 
Karpelès eventually sought insolvency protection in Japanese 
bankruptcy court, where creditors—consisting mainly of Mt. Gox’s unhappy 
customers—filed claims totaling close to $600 million.155 The court entered 
an order of liquidation in April 2014, and appointed Japanese bankruptcy 
practitioner Nobuaki Kobayashi as trustee.156 Pursuant to the cross-border 
 
 146 See id. at 52.  
 147 See id. at 82–83 (showing Karpelès’s slow response to an early denial-of-service attack, which 
suggests that the nascent exchange lacked fundamental security measures); id. at 89–91 (describing a 
2011 Mt. Gox hack in which the price of Bitcoin dropped from $70 to $0.01 over the course of an hour); 
id. at 207 (“[H]ackers showed up and staged fierce denial-of-service attacks, forcing [Karpelès] to shut 
down the site altogether in the middle of the day.”). 
 148 See id. at 200–01 (describing Karpelès’ struggles to manage the challenges presented by Mt. 
Gox’s massive growth); see also id. at 206 (describing one period of extreme volatility where trade delays 
forced buyers to pay as much as $300 per coin, before cancellations drove the price down to $100 a few 
hours later); id. at 307–08 (noting that by early 2014, the price of Bitcoin on Mt. Gox was almost $100 
more than on any other exchange and customers were having difficulty withdrawing their funds). 
 149 See id. at 309. 
 150 See id. at 310–11. 
 151 See id. at 312. Other sources reported the loss at 850,000 bitcoins. See Jon Southurst, Mt. Gox 
Files for Bankruptcy, Claims $63.6 Million Debt, COINDESK (Feb. 28, 2014, 11:33 AM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-files-bankruptcy-claims-63-6m-debt [https://perma.cc/TPD5-
ZQXM]. 
 152 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 315. 
 153 See Casey Doherty, Bitcoin and Bankruptcy, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July 2014, at 39. 
 154 See POPPER, supra note 71, at 315. 
 155 See Stan Higgins, Mt. Gox Bankruptcy Trustee Issues New Details on Creditor Reimbursement, 
COINDESK (Feb. 17, 2016, 10:46 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-bankruptcy-details-creditor-
reimbursement [https://perma.cc/BR9X-S4DE]. 
 156 See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132. 
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provisions of Chapter 15, a companion proceeding was opened in a 
bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Texas.157 
An added twist for the Mt. Gox proceedings, as compared to the 
Quadriga proceedings, was that Kobayashi was able to recover around 
200,000 bitcoins after Karpelès turned over additional crypto assets that had 
been stashed away in Mt. Gox’s system.158 Following Japanese law, the 
bankruptcy court ordered Kobayashi to liquidate the newly discovered 
Bitcoin in order to pay creditor claims in fiat currency, with each Bitcoin’s 
value set at the then-current price of $483.159 However, during the lengthy 
process for customers to submit their claims and obtain court approval, the 
price of Bitcoin rose to eighteen times its 2014 value.160 Continued 
liquidation promised a massive payday for Karpelès, who would receive any 
surplus after customers had been repaid at the depressed price of $483 per 
Bitcoin.161 Not surprisingly, Mt. Gox’s customers protested, arguing that they 
should be paid back in Bitcoin.162 However, Kobayashi’s hands were tied by 
the Japanese legal process, and he proceeded to liquidate close to $400 
million in Bitcoin.163 As the liquidation proceeded, coin prices sunk: 
Bitcoin’s price had peaked in December 2017 at an all-time high of over 
$20,000 per coin; then, as Kobayashi sought to exchange the Bitcoin for fiat 
currency, the price of Bitcoin dropped by half.164 Kobayashi’s single biggest 
transfer of Bitcoin took place on February 5, 2018, which in turn marked a 
 
 157 In re Mt. Gox Co., Ch. 15 No. 14-31229-sgj15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014). 
 158 See Jen Wieczner, Mt. Gox and the Surprising Redemption of Bitcoin’s Biggest Villain, FORTUNE 
(Apr. 19, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/bitcoin-mt-gox-hack-karpeles/ 
[https://perma.cc/QNT4-DUN4] (describing how Karpelès eventually found coins that had been stashed 
away in Mt. Gox’s system). 
 159 See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (explaining that the Japanese court fixed the approved 
claims to the value of Bitcoin as of April 2014, which totaled approximately $400 million). 
 160 Adrianne Jeffries, Inside the Bizarre Upside-Down Bankruptcy of Mt. Gox, VERGE (Mar. 22, 
2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/22/17151430/bankruptcy-mt-gox-liabilities-bitcoin 
[https://perma.cc/94XN-GYYR]. 
 161 See id.; Oscar Williams-Grut, ‘This Is Horse S---’: Bitcoin Traders Are Angry That Mt. Gox’s 
Crypto Stash Is Being ‘Dumped’ on the Market, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-price-traders-angry-over-mt-gox-trustees-bitcoin-sales-2018-
3/?international=true&r=UK [https://perma.cc/N6KT-44X8]. 
 162 As one creditor complained, “Those of us who were burned by this are now permanently locked 
into that depressed price.” See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (quoting software developer Aaron 
Gutman, who lost 464 bitcoins in the hack). 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Williams-Grut, supra note 161. 
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long-term low point for Bitcoin’s valuation at just over $6,000—less than a 
third of its price just two months earlier.165 
Due to this extreme volatility in the price of Bitcoin, the total value lost 
over the course of liquidation dwarfed the total amount of creditors’ 
approved claims. The fact that Karpelès received some surplus after the 
repayments at $483 per Bitcoin was the final straw for creditors, who 
successfully organized to put pressure on Kobayashi to halt the Bitcoin 
sales.166 In June 2018, Mt. Gox’s liquidation was converted to a rehabilitation 
proceeding, which meant that creditors could opt to be repaid in Bitcoin.167 
The price of Bitcoin promptly rebounded.168 
The Mt. Gox liquidation in particular carries an important lesson for 
insolvency systems dealing with crypto assets: forced liquidation of crypto 
assets is a risky process. Not only does forced liquidation often drive down 
creditor recovery (a problem that occurs with many types of assets169), but it 
can also drive down the value for other investors in the crypto asset at 
issue.170 Moreover, unlike forced sales of other assets in bankruptcy 
proceedings, such as real estate, the loss in value to other investors has ripple 
effects globally. A global problem calls for a global solution, so insolvency 
systems should be mindful of the need for uniformity. That said, requiring 
creditors to accept payment in Bitcoin seems to be the fairest system, both 
from the standpoint of creditors and from the perspective of coinvestors who 
would otherwise face losses from large-scale liquidation. Creditors who are 
paid in crypto assets will then be on even footing with other investors, 
regardless of whether they choose to remain invested in the crypto asset. 
 
 165 See id. 
 166 See Jeffries, supra note 160 (describing the formation of Mt. Gox Legal, led by Andy Pag). 
 167 See Kosaku Narioka, Court Blocks Payday for Chief of Bankrupt Mt. Gox Bitcoin Exchange, 
WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2018, 8:23 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-blocks-payday-for-chief-of-
bankrupt-mt-gox-bitcoin-exchange-1529929409 [https://perma.cc/6DZZ-6F5N]. 
 168 The story for Mt. Gox creditors does not yet have a happy ending: rehabilitation proceedings have 
since ground to a halt, due to a massive $16 billion suit filed by Coinlab. See Nikhilesh De, Advocate for 
Mt Gox Creditors Quits, Saying Bitcoin Payouts Could Take Years, COINDESK (Apr. 9, 2019, 9:16 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/coinlabs-mt-gox-claim-may-hold-up-payouts-for-another-2-years 
[https://perma.cc/VZ8D-GAVM]. After successfully leading the creditor uprising that would allow 
repayment in Bitcoin, Pag quit the fight in early 2019 and sold off his claims for quick cash. Id. 
 169 See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk: 
Class, Race, and the ‘Double Discount,’ 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 589, 601–03 (2010) (“In many areas of 
the law it is well accepted that an asset sold at a forced sale will likely sell for a price significantly below 
the asset’s fair market value.”). 
 170 See Doherty, supra note 153, at 38–39 (“[D]ue to Bitcoin’s finite and largely unregulated 
existence, its supply can be easily affected large-scale by outside events, such as the Mt. Gox 
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C. Avoiding Opportunistic Behaviors Enabled by High Volatility 
A third problem that arises with crypto assets is the risk that creditors 
or debtors will exploit bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings in order to 
capitalize on the high volatility of crypto assets. Although such risks exist 
for other assets, the potential for opportunistic behavior is exacerbated by the 
rising use of crypto assets as collateral.171 In particular, the extreme volatility 
of crypto assets means that there are more opportunities for lenders who were 
previously fully secured to suddenly find themselves undersecured. As 
explained in Section I.A, a consumer debtor might then be able to use the 
tools of Chapter 13 to strip down the lender’s lien to the current value of the 
collateral. A business debtor could achieve the same result using the tools of 
Chapter 11. Such opportunistic behavior could take other forms as well. 
However, this Section focuses primarily on the risk of opportunistic behavior 
by the debtor. 
To explore the risks that we might see from crypto investors, we can 
consider behaviors that have already played out in real estate markets. This 
comparison is helpful from a policy perspective because the modern 
bankruptcy code, as well as the court decisions applying it, provide tools 
intended to prevent stakeholders from manipulating the volatility of the real 
estate market.172 However, these tools do not work for crypto assets as the 
volatility risks affect both the individual debtor–creditor relationships and 
the rest of the market for crypto assets. These impacts illustrate that there is 
an even stronger case for congressional intervention in crypto than there was 
for real estate. 
In the business reorganization context, the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by debtors arose primarily from reorganization provisions that 
authorized debtors who obtained secured loans at a time when the collateral 
was highly valued to then use the bankruptcy code to reorganize if the value 
of the collateral fell, even temporarily. Under this scenario, any rise in value 
following a discharge would represent a windfall to the debtor. This strategy 
 
 171 See Robinson, supra note 7. Various lenders have sprung up to take advantage of the consumer 
market for crypto-backed loans, including Celsius, Coinloan, and SALT Lending. See 8 Cryptocurrency 
Lending Platforms, PANORAMA CRYPTO (Oct. 3, 2019), https://panoramacrypto.com/8-cryptocurrency-
lending-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/88G6-VNCH]. 
 172 See Tabb, supra note 46, at 118 (explaining how, in the wake of Pine Gate, secured creditors 
went “straight to the legislature” and obtained “the kinds of protections they wanted against the sort of 
low-ball cram-down ignominy that Pine Gate wrought”). 
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is, in a nutshell, “the Pine Gate problem” that Congress sought to fix in 1978 
when it revamped the bankruptcy code.173 
Professor Douglas Baird has described the circumstances surrounding 
the Pine Gate problem in colorful detail,174 but the basic facts are as follows: 
the Pine Gate bankruptcy involved a debtor who had borrowed $1.45 million 
to build an apartment complex.175 The complex was not nearly as profitable 
as projected, and the secured lender eventually sought to foreclose by 
arguing for a low valuation of the asset.176 But, using the debtor-friendly tools 
of the prior version of the bankruptcy code, Pine Gate’s developers were 
able to use reorganization proceedings not only to retain the apartment 
complex, but also to write down the loan significantly.177 The developers 
emerged from bankruptcy lien-free by paying the formerly secured lender 
$1.032 million—barely two-thirds of the amount the lender had advanced 
just a few years earlier.178 
The Pine Gate decision quickly became infamous in bankruptcy 
circles,179 due in part to the influence of William Norton, Jr., the bankruptcy 
judge who put his stamp of approval on the debtor’s plan.180 Judge Norton’s 
decision was widely criticized for striking the wrong balance: allowing the 
debtor to capture all of the benefits of any future appreciation of the 
apartment complex, while imposing the consequences of any undervaluation 
on the lender.181 Indeed, Congress expressly cited the Pine Gate decision 
when revamping the bankruptcy code.182 
 
 173 See generally Douglas G. Baird, Remembering Pine Gate, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 5, 8 (2004) 
(referring to a debtor’s once unchecked ability to use bankruptcy to write down secured debt as the “Pine 
Gate problem”). 
 174 See id. at 6–8. 
 175 Id. at 7. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See In re Pine Gate Assocs., 1977 WL 373416 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 1977). 
 178 See id. at *1. 
 179 Professor Charles Tabb uses the adjective “notorious” to describe Judge Norton’s decision in Pine 
Gate. See Tabb, supra note 46, at 117. 
 180 See generally Gerald K. Smith, Tribute to William L. Norton, Jr., 4 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, 
Apr. 2002, at 1 (“Many of us first became familiar with Judge Norton as a result of his Pine Gate decision 
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Norton authored the leading U.S. bankruptcy treatise, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, and founded 
the Norton Institutes for Bankruptcy. See generally About Us, NORTON INSTS. ON BANKR. L., 
https://www.nortoninstitutes.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/NDG7-YT8D] (explaining the history of the 
institute and its founder, Judge Norton). 
 181 See Michael E. Rubinger & Gary W. Marsh, Sale of Collateral Plans Which Deny a Nonrecourse 
Undersecured Creditor the Right to Credit Bid: Pine Gate Revisited, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 265, 270 (1993). 
 182 See 124 CONG. REC. 28258 (1978) (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop). 
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In his article, Professor Baird identified three statutory tools that 
Congress enacted to prevent future debtors from similarly exploiting the 
volatility and valuation problems that arise in the real estate lending market: 
Section 1111(b)(1), which allows a lender to turn nonrecourse debt into 
recourse debt; Section 1111(b)(2), which allows a lender to treat the entire 
amount of its allowed claim as secured; and Section 1129(b)(2), which 
ensures that when a plan is confirmed over a lender’s objection, the lender 
will nonetheless receive the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of its 
collateral.183 
These statutory responses to the Pine Gate problem give secured 
creditors more tools to protect themselves from debtors who use volatility 
opportunistically. In particular, these statutory tools prevent secured 
creditors from being at a systemic disadvantage relative to other creditors, or 
to the debtor itself, due to fluctuations in the value of the collateral. 
Importantly, these tools work most effectively if the secured creditor makes 
an accurate assessment about the current and future value of the collateral. 
Of course, creating incentives for accurate valuation does not always ensure 
that the valuation will be accurate. A creditor’s failure to make an accurate 
valuation, if accepted by the court, could still result in forced sales that 
destroy value, thereby inflicting external costs on the broader market.  
This last point is not a significant problem in the real estate market, 
because the fallout from secured creditors’ suboptimal choices is generally 
localized. For example, the collapse of the savings and loan industry in 1984 
prompted a wave of bankruptcy filings involving single asset real estate 
ventures.184 The surge began in Texas and then extended to nearby regions.185 
The Northeast experienced its own surge, as did California and Florida.186 
The relatively localized nature of this crisis allowed local courts to develop 
their own approaches to the flood of cases.187 However, the shortcomings of 
these statutory fixes may become more apparent in the crypto asset market, 
where—as the Mt. Gox trustee demonstrated—untimely liquidations based 
on pessimism about future value can have negative effects that are felt 
 
 183 See Baird, supra note 173, at 9–10. In the interest of concision, this Essay will not attempt to 
provide a detailed explanation of these concepts, but interested readers may find Professor Baird’s article 
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 184 See Hon. Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11—Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 
179–80 (1996). 
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 187 See id. 
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around the globe.188 The risk for opportunistic behavior by creditors is also 
possible, particularly if the creditors are in a position to benefit from 
volatility and can use the statutory tools cynically to create price swings.189 
Finally, the risk of opportunistic behaviors is not limited to Chapter 11 
debtors: consumer debtors may be able to use Chapter 13 to reduce the value 
of liens on crypto collateral.190 Once again, a comparison to the real estate 
market provides helpful context. Prior to 1992, consumer debtors attempted 
to use the bankruptcy code to strip down liens on home mortgages when real 
estate values had fallen.191 The Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Dewsnup 
v. Timm put a halt to this practice.192 Over a sharp dissent from Justice 
Scalia,193 the majority conceded that rejecting the debtor’s straightforward 
application of the lien-stripping provisions of the bankruptcy code was “not 
without its difficulty.”194 However, the majority explained that the “windfall” 
for a debtor who was allowed to use lien stripping in this manner would 
upend the home mortgage market.195 Surely Congress could not have 
intended such a significant outcome.196 
The Dewsnup decision has been widely criticized by courts and 
commentators alike.197 These critiques raise doubts about whether 
Dewsnup’s logic, dependent as it is on the reliance interests of home 
mortgage lenders, would be extended to lenders in the relatively new crypto 
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collateral lending market.198 Thus, in the future, we may see debtors using 
bankruptcy opportunistically to try to strip down liens on crypto collateral, 
creating another round of valuation and statutory interpretation problems for 
bankruptcy courts. 
D. Planning Around Future Jurisdictional Headaches 
A final feature unique to crypto assets is the wrench that these assets 
throw into traditional analysis of jurisdiction. In particular, crypto assets pose 
a new complication when a court’s authority to dispose of certain assets 
depends on in rem jurisdiction: namely, how to determine the location of an 
asset that arguably exists only in digital form. Already we see regulators and 
lawmakers around the world approaching these issues differently. Under 
some proposals, the location of the key that unlocks the digital asset is the 
hook for in rem jurisdiction.199 In others, regulators have focused on the 
location of the server on which the asset is stored.200 Under this approach, to 
determine jurisdiction over a wallet-stored crypto asset, we would look to 
the location of the server for the entity that provides the wallet services. 
Finally, some commentators have argued that jurisdictional concepts are 
meaningless because these assets exist both nowhere and everywhere.201 
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[https://perma.cc/97KW-QARS] (explaining that the trustee should immediately gain control of the 
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Interestingly, the current U.S. approach most closely resembles this 
third option, in that we define our bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction as being 
coextensive with the reach of 11 U.S.C. § 541, which defines property of the 
estate as “property, wherever located and by whomever held.”202 But this 
approach may eventually create conflicts in cross-border cases, where 
Chapter 15 requires U.S. courts to defer to proceedings that occur in “the 
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests”203—also known 
as the COMI principle, which guides European bankruptcy jurisprudence.204 
Although current approaches to cross-border insolvencies have generally 
promoted comity and function over strict adherence to form,205 jurisdictional 
skirmishes have already limited the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
judgments in some instances.206 If other, more favorable jurisdictions opt to 
take a more restrictive approach to in rem jurisdiction over crypto assets, we 
may see similar skirmishes in future large-scale bankruptcies involving 
widely held crypto assets.207 
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH 
As this Essay shows, bankruptcy systems have yet to forge a cogent and 
comprehensive approach for how to manage crypto assets. One explanation 
for the agnostic approach in cases like HashFast,208 and the current void of 
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concrete guidance, is that bankruptcy courts and litigants alike would prefer 
to wait until other authorities have had a full opportunity to characterize and 
regulate this asset. But this wait-and-see approach is a mistake for three 
reasons. 
First, the speculative nature of crypto assets creates a potent risk of a 
future market collapse, which would likely lead to a surge in bankruptcy 
filings. To see how this risk might play out for bankruptcy, we can look to 
the collapse of the real estate market in the early 1980s.209 Single-asset real 
estate filings surged, overwhelming bankruptcy courts.210 This wave of 
filings in turn prompted a variety of inconsistent and arguably inadequate 
responses, including judicial work-arounds that had no basis in the text of 
the bankruptcy code.211 A crypto market failure could have a similarly 
detrimental effect on bankruptcy, with overwhelmed and underprepared 
bankruptcy courts aiming for quick dispositions as opposed to thoughtful 
decisions that guarantee consistency or that make sense from a long-term 
policy perspective. Moreover, the global nature of crypto assets practically 
ensures that the fallout will be far more widespread than it would be with 
other assets. 
Second, there is little upside to a wait-and-see approach, because 
waiting for other authorities to act is unlikely to yield a coherent framework 
that would allow bankruptcy courts to handle these assets efficiently.212 To 
the contrary, legal developments surrounding crypto assets look more like 
regulatory power grabs than an effort to provide a meaningful framework.213 
Moreover, as Part II shows, crypto assets have unique features that create 
idiosyncratic problems for bankruptcy. Accordingly, waiting on other actors 
would likely leave the bankruptcy system with a patchwork approach that 
still forces difficult and uncertain choices about how to handle crypto assets 
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 213 See, e.g., id. at 320–23 (describing the patchwork of state and federal regulation and judicial 
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than pursuing overlapping but disparate regulatory actions). 
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in bankruptcy proceedings. Because crypto assets create unique problems in 
the bankruptcy context, bankruptcy will likely need its own framework to 
properly address how these assets should function within bankruptcy.214 
Third, a wait-and-see approach could inhibit the development of 
reliable crypto enterprises here in the United States, which in turn could 
eventually limit U.S. courts’ ability to take meaningful action in bankruptcies 
and reorganizations that involve crypto assets. Without any real certainty or 
even guidance about how crypto assets will be treated under Title 11 of the 
United States Code, sophisticated players may be tempted to look elsewhere 
for a framework that provides more clarity (or, from a cynical perspective, 
lax regulation).215 Moreover, depending on how the jurisdictional issues 
discussed in Section II.D play out, the COMI principles followed by the 
European Union could eventually become a barrier to U.S. courts seeking to 
exercise jurisdiction over digital assets held on foreign servers.216 Large-scale 
cases involving crypto assets would more likely be filed in jurisdictions that 
have a stronger COMI claim, and U.S. courts may be shut out of this arena 
entirely. 
CONCLUSION 
The possibility that the United States will be shut out of the crypto 
bankruptcy arena is an important consideration for the country, one that 
raises questions about its continued leadership role, not just in insolvency 
but in the future global economy. Although myths of American 
exceptionalism may at times overstate the case, the United States has long 
been recognized as a global leader in corporate reorganization.217 Though the 
U.S. system may not always get the right answer, our decades of experience 
with a time-tested framework for Chapter 11 reorganizations serves as a 
useful base model that other countries can choose either to mirror or to 
deviate from. Either way, the choice is both conscious and informed. 
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However, if the United States’ insolvency systems continue to ignore 
the mounting issues presented by crypto assets, we may see other 
jurisdictions stepping into that void and positioning themselves as the base 
model for handling crypto assets. Perhaps that is for the best, but at the very 
least, the possibility of a future in which U.S. bankruptcy courts are relegated 
to second-tier status ought to be a conscious and informed choice. This is 
exactly why the United States bankruptcy system’s lack of focus on crypto 
assets is so troubling: without some centralized effort to address the 
particular challenges associated with crypto assets, we may find ourselves 
with no choices left at all. 
 
